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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the exchange rate disconnect  puzzle of Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
(2000) from a behavioural perspective. It provides evidence on the existence of 
substantial asymmetries in the underlying loss preferences for the difference between 
the spot and forward nominal exchange rates between the G7 countries for one-week 
and four-week forecast horizons. We further perform forecast breakdown tests  in 
forward markets during the Greek and the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis, and then 
re-estimate the loss preferences showing a mean-reverting transition from optimism to 
pessimism and vice versa. Finally, we attribute the evolution of preferences to 
economic fundamentals and risk indexes and find that together with significant 
endogenous dynamics, variables such as growth and deficit differentials, interest rate 
and legal risk assert some significant impact on asymmetry. This new set of 
information suggests that the puzzle could have its roots on an underlying asymmetric 
loss function that reflects variability in preferences over exchange rate movements 
due to a variety of episodes in economic fundamentals. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In their seminal paper Meese and Rogoff (1983) argue that ‘exchange rate 
macroeconomic models, forecast exchange rates in the short- and medium-term no 
better than a random walk’, whereas this puzzle was named as the exchange rate 
disconnect puzzle in (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
 
A simple model for testing the above puzzle is given as: 
 
( ) 11 ++ +−+=− ttttt εsfβαss     (1) 
 
where st, and ft stands for the spot and one-period forward rate at time t respectively. 
The above equation is essentially an error-correction mechanism, which under the null 
hypothesis of forward rate forecast unbiasedness, should exhibit β = 1 and α = 0. 
Empirical tests of the above equation failed to produce a silver bullet, see Clarida and 
Taylor (1997), and Clarida et al. (2001). Departing from this hypothesis would imply 
failure of rational expectations and market efficiency. Mark (1995) and Mark and Sul 
(2001), focus on the econometric issues and the underlying time series properties of 
the spot and forward exchange rate and show that the puzzle holds. However, 
Berkowitz and Giorgianni (2001) and Faust et al. (2003) provide evidence that tends 
to accept market efficiency and thus reject the puzzle. In a recent study, Lothian and 
Wu (2011) construct ultra-long time series that span two centuries of exchange rates 
to test the uncovered interest parity and document the presence of substantial biases in 
the formation of expectations. 
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The present paper fills a gap in the literature by offering an alternative path of 
investigation, employing a recent testing and estimation procedures proposed by 
Elliott et al (2005) and Giacomini and Rossi (2009). We view the forward exchange 
rate as a pure market forecast of the future spot rate and ask the following question: 
are asymmetries over the underlying loss function of the spot-forward forecast error 
responsible for the observed biases in equation (1)? The presence of such asymmetries 
could provide an alternative explanation of the disconnect puzzle, implying the 
presence of preference-based rational bias in the formation of expectations.  
Furthermore, we depart from the literature that attempts to identify the main 
determinants of the exchange rate and provide an analysis of the correlation between 
the preference asymmetry parameter estimate and a number of fundamental economic 
variables, thus identifying the main variables that affect the formation of preferences 
and thus expectations in the market as mirrored in the loss function. 
 
 
Our findings suggest the presence of significant loss preference asymmetries in 
forward foreign exchange markets especially for longer horizons, which are shown to 
evolve over time in conjunction with detected forecast breakdowns, often in response 
to changes in economic fundamentals and risk indices. These results provide a new 
perspective to explain the exchange rate disconnect puzzle whilst offer a new 
information set for market participants in forward markets and policy makers alike. In 
some detail, to the extent  that underlying preferences of forward markets are revealed 
and become common knowledge all participants could take advantage of this 
information and readjust their preferences if needed. The main reason of readjusting 
their preferences is that if all  share the same symmetric or, indeed, asymmetric loss 
function this would contribute towards rationality in their behaviour. On the other 
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hand, the absence of a common loss function could help explain why ‘exchange rate 
disconnect puzzle’ prevails. It might be simply the case that not all participants in 
forward markets share the same loss function. 
 
In section 2 we present a brief literature review, in section 3 we outline our 
methodological estimation and testing framework and in section 4 we present our data 
set and empirical results on forecast breakdown and preference parameter estimation. 
In section 5 we outline our analysis and results for the attribution of estimated 
preference parameters to economic fundamentals, and in section 6 we conclude. 
 
2. Literature review  
There is no consensus in the literature on the factors affecting exchange rates. The 
debate focused at the beginning on the role of macroeconomic fundamentals in short- 
and long-run forecasting versus random walk and later on the presence of non-
linearities. In the first debate, three principal views have emerged in the literature: 
First, for macroeconomic versus random walk forecasts for short-time horizons and 
for countries without high inflation, macroeconomic fundamentals do not seem to 
perform better than a random walk in out-of-sample forecasting, see Meese and 
Rogoff (1983). Second, macroeconomic fundamentals do play an important role in 
explaining the behaviour of exchange rates, see McDonald (1999). For some authors 
such fundamentals are important in the long run but have little to offer in explaining 
short-run movements, whilst for others macroeconomic fundamentals contribute to 
both long run and short run dynamics. Last, neither macroeconomic fundamentals nor 
the random walk model adequately account for exchange rate behaviour at short 
horizons. This view attributes short-run exchange rate movements to market 
microstructure factors, such as inventory management and information aggregation, 
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often reflecting adaptive learning processes about the economic fundamentals, see 
Lyons (2001).  
 
Kilian and Taylor (2003) provide empirical evidence showing that the evolution of the 
real exchange rate is well approximated by a nonlinear, exponential smooth transition 
autoregressive (ESTAR) model, accounting for the presence of persistence and 
volatility of real exchange rates. Kilian and Taylor found strong evidence of 
predictability for horizons of 2 to 3 years, but not for shorter horizons. Furthermore, 
other research work documenting various nonlinearities in deviations of the spot 
exchange rate from economic fundamentals has been contributed by Balke and Fomby 
(1997), Taylor and Peel (2000), Taylor et al. (2001). These studies offer empirical 
support to exchange rate predictability and reconcile the presence of economic 
fundamentals, see also Allen and Taylor (1990, 1992), Taylor and Allen (1992), 
Cheung and Chinn (1999).  
  
3. Methodology 
The empirical testing of equation (1) has been based on statistical criteria penalising 
symmetrically over- and under-forecasting. We deviate fundamentally from this 
practice and focus on the structure of the market forecast decision-making process. 
We view the distance between a market-based forward rate and the corresponding 
future spot rate as a forecast error generated through a forecast decision making 
process: the market chooses at time t the forward rate referring to period t + s which 
minimises the expected loss resulting in from mis-forecasting. It is known, see 
Granger (1969) and Christoffersen and Diebold (1997), that in the presence of 
asymmetric loss preferences, optimal forecasts are composed of the conditional 
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expectation plus a rational bias component involving a non-linear interaction between 
the shape of the loss function and higher moments of the variable to be forecasted. It 
is exactly the presence of this rational bias that may explain the failure of testing 
procedures under equation (1). In the following we shall outline an estimation 
procedure for the underlying loss function, a statistical test for forecast rationality, as 
well as a statistical test for forecast breakdown in the presence of generalised loss 
preferences.  
 
3.1 Estimation of Preferences  
Observing time series of past exchange rate forecast errors we shall follow Elliott et al 
(2005) to devise a Method-of-Moments estimator for the parameter controlling the 
shape of the underlying loss function.         
 
Consider a flexible loss function of the form: 
 
                           L(p,!) ! [! + (1" 2!) #1(st+s ft+s<0) ] st+s " ft+s
p                               (2) 
 
where, st+s – ft+s is the s-period-ahead exchange rate forecast error, p = 1, 2,  α∈(0,1), 
1 is an indicator that takes value of 1 if st+s – ft+s negative and zero otherwise. For p = 
1 the above equation nests the double linear function (Lin-Lin) and for p = 2 it nests 
the double quadratic function (Quad-Quad).  For α = 1/2 the loss function is 
symmetric and for α < 1/2 (α > 1/2) the loss exhibits asymmetry towards a higher 
penalty for over-predictions (under-predictions). 
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By observing the sequence of spot – forward forecast errors { st+s – ft+s }, τ ≤ t < T + τ 
an estimate for α is constructed using a linear Instrumental Variable estimator Tαˆ , as 
follows: 
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where vt is a D x 1 vector of instruments, which is a subset of the full information set 
Wt used to generate fˆ , and Sˆ  is given by:  
 
       Sˆ !T( ) =
1
!
vtvt ' (1(st+s" fˆt+s<0) "!T )
2 st+s " fˆt+s
2 p"2
t="
!+""1
#                       (4) 
 
, where Tα  is a consistent initial estimate of 0α . Since S depends on Tαˆ , estimation 
is performed iteratively. In the first iteration we assume IS =ˆ , the identity matrix, to  
estimate 1αˆ , which is then used to re-estimate Sˆ  and 2αˆ for the second iteration. The 
process is then repeated until convergence for S. Elliott et al (2005) show that the 
estimator of Tαˆ  is asymptotically normal and construct a J-statistic which under the 
joint null hypothesis of forecast rationality and flexible loss function is distributed as 
a ( )12 −Χ D variable for D > 1, which takes the form: 
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For robustness in the empirical application, we apply equations (3) and (4) for both p 
= 1, 2 using two and three instruments (D = 2, 3), in particular a constant and lagged 
difference between spot and forward exchange rates as well as the latter two and the 
lagged spot. 
     
In the context of asymmetric preferences given in equation (2) of our paper, stf +  is an 
optimal forecast if and only if the first order forecast optimality conditions will be 
 
( ) 0ˆ 1
)0ˆ(
=⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡ −−
−
++<− ++
p
ststfst fsWE stst α1     (6) 
 
where Wt is the full set of factors and are known to the forecaster at time t and a is the 
loss asymmetry parameter. If for given a and p the forecaster uses the above condition 
to determine ft+s (Elliott et al show that this solution is unique), then for given ft+s it is 
possible to use the same condition to uniquely back out a. Then, Lemma 2 of Elliott et 
al. proves that the above condition is sufficient to identify a using a sub vector Vt of 
Wt. Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2009) contribute an application for 
macroeconomic forecasts as well as robustness checks for this estimation 
methodology.  
 
3.2 A Test for Forecast Breakdowns 
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When looking at the forecast decision making process for long time periods, one 
could reasonably argue that during this period there may have been events that could 
alter the shape parameter, α, of the underlying loss function. According to Credit 
Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook (2012), “… investor behavior is a highly 
social phenomenon, and attitudes towards risk oscillate periodically from over-
exuberance to excessive pessimism and back again …”.  The literature often refers to 
specific dates of important events that took place since the inception of the euro and 
asserted a crucial impact in the world market. We wish to assess the impact of such 
events on the shape of the underlying loss function of market forecasts. We employ 
the methodology proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2009) to test for breakdowns in 
the forecasting ability of the market after the occurrence of major economic events. 
This is a newly established test building on the generalized loss function framework 
similar to the one used in section 3.1.  
 
Given a sample of T observations and a forecast horizon s, we follow Giacomini and 
Rossi (2009) to distinguish between m in sample and n = T – m – s + 1 out-of-sample 
forecast errors. As in Giacomini and Rosi (2009) we allow for three schemes of 
forecast formation: (i) a fixed scheme, where the in-sample window at time t contains 
observations indexed 1,…,m; (ii) a rolling scheme, where in-sample window at time t 
contains observations indexed t-m+1,…,t; and (iii) a recursive scheme, where the in-
sample window includes observations indexed 1,…,t. We define a forecast breakdown 
as deterioration in the out-of sample performance of the forecast model relative to its 
in-sample performance. According to Giacomini and Rossi, this is formalized by 
defining a “surprise loss” SLt+s at time t + s as the difference between the out-of-
sample loss Lt+s at time t + s and the average in-sample loss tL  at time t  
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, where the out-of-sample loss is given by 
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The term tL  is computed over the in-sample window implied by the respective 
forecasting scheme, that is 
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Then, the average surprise loss is given by  
 
∑
−
=
+
−≡
sT
mt
stnm SLnSL
1
,        (8) 
Based on equation (8), if the forecasting ability of the forward exchange rate is 
maintained from the in-sample to the out-of-sample prediction, then the average 
surprise loss should not differ significantly from zero. Otherwise, a forecast 
breakdown has taken place. Thus, the null hypothesis of no forecast breakdown takes 
the form: 
( ) 0: ,0 =nmSLEH     (9) 
which can be tested through the test statistic 
nm
nm
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SLnt
,
,
,, σˆ
=     (10) 
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where nm,σˆ  is the asymptotic variance estimator as given in section 2.6 of Giacomini 
and Rossi (2009). A level α test would reject the null hypothesis of no forecast 
breakdown when tm,n,s  > zα , that is when it exceeds the value of the (1-α)-th quintile 
of the standard normal distribution. For purposes of the current paper, we test for 
forecast breakdowns in forward exchange rate markets based on the above test 
statistic. The breakdown points are defined as unexpected events, exogenous, that 
could trigger–off a different behavioral pattern of the market in terms of providing 
accurate predictions.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Our data set consists of weekly frequency series of one- and four-week spot and 
forward exchange rates for the G7 countries, 1/02/2002 to 26/10/2012. Therefore, this 
concerns five currencies (US Dollar-USD, Euro-EUR, Great Britain Pound-GBP, 
Japanese Yen-JPY, and Canadian Dollar-CAN) and thus ten exchange rates.  The data 
were retrieved from Bloomberg.   
 
4.1 Estimation of Loss Functions: 2002-2012 
We estimate the parameter α of the generalized loss function (2) for both the linear (p 
= 1) and non-linear (p = 2) specification. To this effect, we do not impose any specific 
shape in the preference structure since both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions 
are included in the model as special cases. Our estimation is performed using three 
instruments (D = 3), in particular the lagged forecast error, lagged spot and lagged 
forward rate3. Our parameter of interest, α, determines the preference asymmetry of 
the loss function. For α = 0.5 the loss function is symmetric with respect to positive or 
                                                
3 The main results hold also in the case of one or two instruments. Results are available upon request  
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negative exchange rate premium (s – f), which implies unbiased expectations 
hypothesis under equation (1). For α < 0.5 the loss function exhibits asymmetry 
towards a higher penalty for over-prediction, i.e. negative exchange rate premium, 
which in turn implies a rational bias to the direction of appreciation of the currency 
exchange rate. Likewise, for α > 0.5 the loss function exhibits asymmetry towards a 
higher penalty for under-prediction, i.e. positive exchange rate premium, which in 
turn implies that a rational bias is present to the direction of depreciation of the 
currency exchange rate.  
 
We report our empirical results in Table 1 for one-week horizon data and in Table 2 
for four-week horizon data.  Our estimated loss function parameters are all 
statistically different from zero as our estimated standard errors suggest.  We also 
report the J-test for forecast rationality under four different null hypotheses, 
aaH ˆ:0 =  (from the estimation), α = 0.2, α = 0.5, and α = 0.8. Our choice for the 
latter three values is ad hoc, reflecting clear cases of loss asymmetry towards currency 
appreciation, neutrality and loss asymmetry towards currency depreciation, 
respectively. It is evident from Table 1 that loss function parameters for one-week 
forecast horizon are close to symmetry, where in most of the cases their difference 
from 0.5 is not statistically significant, whilst J-tests for forecast rationality4 suggest 
that it is generally not rejected, given the estimated parameters. These results remain 
fundamentally unchanged for both linear and quadratic specifications of the loss 
function. Reviewing Table 2 we observe that loss function parameters for four-week 
forecast horizon have moved towards asymmetry, where in all cases their difference 
from 0.5 is statistically significant. In most of the cases losses are higher for over-
                                                
4 The test of forecast rationality refers to the formal testing procedure for the joint presence of optimal 
forecasts and asymmetric loss as shown in equation (5). 
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prediction of the exchange rate (α < 0.5), that is negative exchange rate premium, thus 
leading to a rational bias towards currency appreciation. In two cases, JPY/USD and 
CAN/USD, we observe loss function parameters (α > 0.5), generating losses that are 
higher for under-prediction of the exchange rate, positive exchange rate premium, 
thus leading to a rational bias towards currency depreciation. J tests suggest the 
striking result that, for four-week forecast horizon, rationality is strongly rejected in 
all cases. These results are intensified for quadratic specification of the loss function. 
                                          
<<Tables 1 and 2 about here>> 
 
Overall, we find strong evidence for symmetric preferences in one-week forecast 
horizon and asymmetric preferences in four-week forecast horizon. Our estimates of 
the loss function parameter α takes values of less than 0.5 for most exchange-rates, 
whilst for just two cases, α takes values higher than 0.5. These results suggest that for 
shorter horizons markets appear to project current data in an unbiased way, while at 
the same time for longer horizons appear to develop rational bias towards appreciation 
in most of the cases and depreciation in two cases. 
 
4.2 Testing for Forecast Breakdowns  
Our results in section 4.1 have uncovered preference asymmetries that reflect the 
sampling properties over a ten-year period. However, since the inception of the Euro, 
a number of major events have taken place in the international markets that may have 
caused forecast breakdowns. These are often interpreted as changes in the forecasting 
ability of the markets when judged on the basis of conventional criteria. Given the 
continuous revision of market forecasting models, we argue that such forecast 
 14 
breakdowns may instead reflect changes in the structure of the underlying market 
preferences rather than a failure of forecasting models. The emergence of a major 
event in the international economy often triggers a realignment in views on a number 
of fundamental variables or relationships in the economy. This often takes the form of 
a change in the probability weighting scheme that the markets assign to possible 
future events, reflecting the degree of optimism or pessimism about future events and 
in some cases the switch from one regime to the other. For example, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers could have triggered a realization of risk under-estimation in the 
past. Likewise, bailouts for euro-area countries under enormous fiscal stress, such as 
in the case of Greece and Portugal, have raised uncertainties regarding the political 
economy aspects of the euro in relation to safeguarding the ability of all euro area 
countries to remain in the monetary union. In this section we shall test for forecast 
breakdowns using the methodology of Giacomini and Rossi (2009) outlined in section 
3.2, focusing on three major events that may have caused breaking points: 15th 
September 2008, marking the date of Lehman Brother bankruptcy; 2nd May 2010, 
marking the bailout of Greece through an emergency financing mechanism from the 
European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund,; 
and 3rd May 2011 marking the bailout of Portugal through the same sovereign 
financing mechanism.  
  
The three assumed breaking points split our sample into four sub-samples. Our testing 
procedure examines sequentially the three resulting pairs of sub-samples: First, from 
January 1, 2002, to Lehman Brothers collapse on September 15, 2008, to Greek 
bailout on May 2, 2010; second, from Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008, to Greek bailout on May 2, 2010, to Portuguese bailout on May 5, 2011; and 
third, from Greek bailout on May 2, 2010, to Portuguese bailout on May 5, 2011, to 
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October 26, 2012. In every pair we view the first sub-sample as our in sample forecast 
error data and the second sub-sample as our out-of-sample forecast error data. We 
apply our testing procedures using a symmetric quadratic loss function and all three 
forecasting schemes, fixed, rolling and recursive, on both one-week and four-week 
forecast horizon data.  
 
Our results are presented in Table 3. The empirical evidence suggests that the null 
hypothesis of no forecast breakdown is not rejected in the case of Lehman Brothers 
collapse. In particular, in Table 3 the first three columns report p-values of the 
Giacomini and Rossi (2009) forecast breakdown test for the case of possible structural 
break on 15th September 2009, that is the date of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, for 
three forecasting schemes; fixed, rolling and recursive, on both one-week and four-
week forecast horizons. One could not fail to notice that all reported p-values are 
taking values close to one and as such they suggest that, indeed, no structural break 
down has been triggered by the dramatic events in Lehman Brothers. 
 
Interestingly, we find overwhelming evidence suggesting that the null hypothesis is 
rejected in most of the exchange rate cases in the presence of the Greek and the 
Portuguese bailouts. The effect is severe in the case of Greek bailout in which both 
one-week and four-week horizon forecasts breakdown. Note that in the case of Greece 
for all exchange rates, but CAN/EUR that exhibits remarkably stability, under all 
forecasting schemes for both 1 week and 4 weeks horizon structural breakdowns are 
detected. Similarly, in the case of Portuguese bailout, whereas the null hypothesis of 
no structural break is rejected for most exchange rates, except for the exchange rates 
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of yen with respect to euro, USD, and GBP for the longer horizon of four weeks 
forecasts. 
<< Table 3 around here >> 
 
 
4.3 Estimation of Loss Functions in Sub-periods  
 
Our evidence in section 4.2 suggests strong forecast breakdowns in the presence of 
Greek and Portuguese crises, pointing towards the possibility of temporal changes in 
the loss preferences of the market. In this section we present our loss function 
estimation and testing results in four sub-samples as defined in the introduction of 
section 4. The one-week-ahead results are presented in Tables 4-7 and the four-week-
ahead results are presented in Tables 8-11. In all cases the estimated parameters are 
highly statistically significant. We observe severe inter-temporal fluctuations of the 
preference parameters away from symmetry α = 0.5, for both forecast horizons, 
showing a mean-reverting transition from optimism to pessimism and vice versa. 
Preference changes between forecast horizons show significant positive correlation, 
however, the degree of variation of preference parameters along different sampling 
periods differs substantially between the two forecast horizons, indicatively for four-
week-ahead they fluctuate between 0.13 and 0.89 whilst for one-week-ahead they 
fluctuate between 0.33 and 0.64 for the linear specification of the loss function. In 
addition, for a quadratic specification of the loss function we observe that the 
evolution of the preference parameters exhibits a very similar pattern to the one 
coming from the linear case for one-week-horizon forecasts, whilst for four-week-
horizon forecasts the variation becomes even more extensive. Finally, it is worth 
noting that forecast rationality tests exhibit the same pattern with the full sample 
results, where rationality is maintained in all cases one-week-ahead and rejected in all 
cases four-week-ahead. 
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<<Tables 4-11 around here>> 
 
5. Attribution of Loss Preferences to Economic Fundamentals 
Studies on exchange rate forecasting, such as Meese and Rogoff (1983), show that 
exchange rate models that include macroeconomic fundamentals do not perform 
better than a random walk for short horizons, whilst McDonald (1999) argues that 
macroeconomic fundamentals play an important role in explaining the behaviour of 
exchange rates. Others suggest that market microstructure factors affect exchange 
rate, see Lyons (2001). Given the vague empirical evidence on exchange rate 
forecasting, in this section we shall focus on the attribution of preferences over 
forecasts, rather than forecasts themselves, on economic fundamentals. In the previous 
section we estimate over time the asymmetric loss parameter, α, for the four cases 
corresponding to linear or quadratic loss functions and to one-week or four-week 
forecast horizon. Then, given the estimated parameters in tables 4-11, our next step is 
to examine the main underlying explanatory variables. Specifically, as in Clarida and 
Taylor (1997) and Clarida et al. (2001) we include variables that reflect main 
macroeconomic development such as output, inflation, risk free rate as in Skinner and 
Mason (2011)5, unemployment rate, balance of payments, terms of trade and budget 
deficit, obtained from Datastream. In addition, we choose some variables to reflect 
risks and uncertainty on a wider institutional, economic and political base, see for 
example Cosset and Rianderie (1985), Baily and Chung (1995), such as legal risk, tax 
risk, operational risk, political risk, economic risk and security risk, obtained from 
Global Insight. Since each data point, αi, of our dependent variable is an estimate 
                                                
5 In a recent paper, the authors identify the role of credit risk for the covered interest rate parity.  
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derived from a sample with size Ti, for every explanatory variable we use summary 
information over the respective time period, so we calculate its mean. Then, since our 
dependent variable is a preference parameter over a relative variable, all explanatory 
variables are also converted to relative terms, i.e. the ratio of mean USD GDP growth 
to mean EUR GDP growth.  
 
Given the evidence of the previous section on the dynamics of loss preference 
parameters, we adopt the Arellano-Bover (1995) Dynamic Panel modeling approach 
and GMM estimation of parameters along with robust standard errors. The i-th panel 
equation takes the form: 
 
( )
( ) it
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j fj
dj
jtwitwitwi XMean
XMean
bbbb εααα ++++= ∑
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where i = 1,...,10 and t = 1,...,4. Variable αi,4w,t is the sample-t estimate of Quad-Quad 
loss parameter of the i-th four-week exchange rate forecast error and αi,1w,t is the 
corresponding estimate of Quad-Quad loss parameter of the i-th one-week exchange 
rate forecast error. Furthermore, Xj,d denotes the j-th domestic explanatory variable 
which is expressed in relative terms with respect to the corresponding variable Xj,f  of 
the denominating foreign currency.  
 
We present our empirical results in Table 12. We follow an empirical model building 
from specific to general, in which Model 1 presents a panel auto-regression, Model 2 
augments Model 1 with the one-week estimate of α, Model 3 and 4 augments Model 2 
with macroeconomic variables, Model 5 augments Model 2 with risk variables and 
finally Model 6 attempts to augment Model 2 with both macroeconomic and risk 
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variables6. It appears that endogenous dynamics as captured by the panel auto-
regressive parameter and spill over effects from one-week horizon preferences are 
statistically significant and positive. Moreover, as it is evident in Model 1 the AR 
component is highly statistical significant and is mean reverting around 0.5 that is the 
case of a symmetric underlying loss preferences. Regarding the impact of weekly 
alphas on monthly alphas, it is found to be highly significant and positive. This 
evidence holds across all six models in Table 12 and suggests the existence of spill 
over effects from short horizon preferences to long horizon ones.  
 
<< Insert Table 12 around here >> 
 
These effects are complemented in Models 3 and 4 with the statistically significant 
impact of macroeconomic variables, consistent with Balke and Fomby (1997), Taylor 
and Peel (2000) and Taylor et al. (2001),7 which take economically meaningful 
parameter signs. In particular, when the sign of the parameter is positive, as in the 
case of growth differential and deficit differential across G7 countries, then an 
increase of such a differential will lead to higher asymmetry of the underlying loss 
function towards heavier penalty to under prediction, that is the case of the spot being 
higher than the forward. On the other hand, a negative sign will indicate the reverse 
effect. Turning our attention to Model 5, we introduce a group of risk indexes. We 
observe that among all risks, legal risk is the one asserting a significant and positive 
                                                
6 Note that our empirical model in eq. (7) does not impose the theoretical restriction 10 ≤≤ α . 
However, our diagnostic checks on in-sample fitted values of the dependent variable confirm that it 
always satisfies the theoretical bounds. 
7 Please note that our approach links macroeconomic fundamentals to the underlying preference 
parameters, that is to the rational bias of exchange rate forecasts, rather than to exchange rate itself as 
suggested by the traditional literature, see for example Allen and Taylor (1990, 1992), Taylor and Allen 
(1992), Cheung and Chinn (1999). 
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impact on alphas. However, risk variables cannot be combined successfully with 
economic variables as shown in Model 6.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that preferences tend to correlate with economic 
fundamentals and shorter horizon and past preferences in a non-trivial way, pointing 
to the perception of analysts about oscillating market behaviour, see for example 
Credit Suisse (2012).  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has been motivated by the long-established inconclusive literature 
questioning the efficiency of the foreign exchange market, on the basis of empirical 
tests reflecting symmetric preferences. We relax this assumption and allow for 
generalized asymmetric preferences using a newly established methodology of Elliott 
et al (2005). This paper provides evidence on the existence of substantial asymmetries 
in the underlying loss preferences for the difference between the spot and forward 
nominal exchange rates between the G7 countries for one-week and four-week 
forecast horizons. For the full sample 2002-2012 we find that, in the context of both 
linear and non-linear loss functions, the underlying loss preferences for four-week-
horizon data are predominantly asymmetric, whilst for one-week exchange rates 
asymmetry tends to weaken. Using a new test developed by Giacomini and Rossi 
(2009), we test for forecast breakdowns during this period. Breakdowns in forward 
market observed for the Greek and the Portuguese crisis, but interestingly not for the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. This evidence provided motivation to re-estimate the 
loss preferences in subsamples according to the detected forecast breakdown points, 
leading to estimates exhibiting severe inter-temporal fluctuations of the preference 
parameters. The new preferences show strong mean-reverting transition from 
optimism to pessimism and vice versa. As a third stage analysis, we attribute the 
evolution of preferences to economic fundamentals and risk indexes using a dynamic 
panel approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and uncover that together with 
significant endogenous dynamics, variables such as growth differential, interest rate 
and legal risk assert some significant impact on asymmetry. 
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The reported presence of asymmetries in the underlying loss function shed new light 
into the disconnect puzzle, implying the presence of preference-based rational bias in 
the formation of expectations.  The revealed asymmetries in the loss function should 
be taken into account in any future modelling of foreign exchange rates whilst one 
should also take into account that the underlying preferences do not remain stable 
over time but shift from optimism to pessimism and vice versa. 
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